

## Q5 Legal/Reference 21

### **The Road Map of the Conflict Resolution in Abkhazia<sup>1</sup>**

In June 2006, the Georgian side drafted and presented the "Road Map" with the purpose of implementing a full-scale resolution of the Abkhazian conflict. The Georgian Road Map was based on the following principles:<sup>2</sup>

- Granting a wide autonomy to Abkhazia within the federal Georgian state;
- Conferring on Abkhazia the right of representation in the central Georgian government, as well as providing full protection of the Abkhaz language, culture and historical heritage;
- Returning the IDPs into their homes;
- Resolving the Abkhazian conflict peacefully and restoring the atmosphere of dialogue and mutual trust;
- Including the international and regional organizations into the process of the peaceful resolution of the Abkhazian conflict;

Assisting the development of the economy of Abkhazia and implementing the mutually coordinated economic projects.

### **July 17 2006 Comments of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Merab Antadze over the statements of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov at a press-conference held within the frames of the G8 Summit, on July 16<sup>3</sup>**

On May 24, the Georgian side submitted to the Abkhazian side a set of concrete proposals for conflict resolution, the so-called 'Road Map'. The Georgian President has confirmed on more than one occasion his readiness to meet with the de-facto leader of the region without any preconditions.

The initial stage of conflict resolution in Abkhazia, Georgia involves the return of refugees and internally displaced persons first of all to the Gali district - a task to which the Georgian Authorities are deeply committed. The provision of safety guarantees and the opening of a Gali branch of UN human rights office of Sukhumi and the deploying of UN civil police component are set as the main conditions for launching this process. This is exactly what a range of UN resolutions, including the latest dated March 31 call the Abkhazian side for.

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<sup>1</sup> The Abkhaz *de facto* authorities did not consider the mentioned document and proposed their own initiatives, lacking the sense of reality perception – "the key to the

future". [http://rrc.ge/law/Cinadab\\_2006\\_10\\_05\\_E.htm?lawid=1682&lng\\_3=en](http://rrc.ge/law/Cinadab_2006_10_05_E.htm?lawid=1682&lng_3=en)

<sup>2</sup> [http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang\\_id=ENG&sec\\_id=1315&info\\_id=22617](http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=1315&info_id=22617)

<sup>3</sup> [http://mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang\\_id=ENG&sec\\_id=35&info\\_id=1827](http://mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=35&info_id=1827)

At the same time I would like to note that a meeting of the respective working group held in Sukhumi, on July 11, under the UN aegis, which was attended by representatives of the Group of Friends discussed the above-said issues, agreed to continue work and scheduled the next meeting for September 2006.

**Abkhazia, ways forward - International Crisis Group report, January 2007.**<sup>4</sup>

There was optimism in spring 2006 that extensive discussions on increasing cooperation and resolving disputes could begin: the sides resumed talks within the UN-led Coordinating Council for the first time since January 2001, the Abkhaz presented a “Key to the Future” document, and Georgia issued a “Road Map”. But nothing came of it. After Georgia launched a Special Forces operation in the Kodori valley in July, the Abkhaz pulled out of all negotiations. Diplomacy is frozen, with few incentives to restart it. Georgia has adopted a new strategy, calling for changes in the formats for negotiations and peacekeeping so as to reduce Russia’s influence in both. Moscow and Sukhumi oppose these changes, and they are not strongly backed by Georgia’s Western partners.

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4619>