

5. What types of units were used and how many troops were deployed in general and for particular operations? What percentage were conscripts and reservists?

a) What types of units were used and how many troops were deployed in general and for particular operations?

From the Georgian side the following units were engaged in military operations during the conflict (total strength approximately 10,000):

- Land Forces Command – II, III, IV Infantry Brigades, I Artillery Brigade, 53rd Infantry Battalion (Battalion), Artillery and Mechanized Battalions (1st Brigade), Separate Tank Battalion, Separate Infantry Battalion, Air Defense Battalion, Medical Battalion.
- Air Forces Command – Su-25 fixed wing, Mi-24 rotary wing, Mi-8/17, UH-1H rotary wing, Air Defense radar and SHORAD (Short Range Air Defense) units.
- Special Forces Command – SF Battalion.
- Education Department – mountain training school’s Co size unit, Krtsanisi Training Center Co (Company) size unit.
- National Guard Department – reserve units.
- Military Police Department – traffic management teams.
- Armed Forces Logistic Department – Log Support Battalion.
- Anti-riot and counter terrorism Battalion size units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
- I Brigade was in Iraq and after return was not employed in battle.

As from the Russian side, here is an incomplete list of the Russian army units, which participated in the invasion of Georgia (this information was gathered from different Russian media sources):

1. The 58th Army of the Russian Ground Forces, including:

- The 19th Motor Rifle Division – Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia, represented by:
 - 135th Separate Motor Rifle Regiment – Prochladni, Kabardino-Balkaria (the one that entered on August 7th);
 - 693rd Motor Rifle Regiment – Zaramag, North Ossetia (the one that entered on August 7th);
 - 429th Motor Rifle Regiment named after Kuban Cossacks – Mozdok, North Ossetia;
 - 503rd Motor Rifle Regiment – Troitskoe, Ingushetia;
 - 292nd Self-propelled Artillery Regiment – Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia;
 - 1415th Separate Jet-Propelled Artillery Battalion – Prochladni, Kabardino-Balkaria;
 - 141st Separate Tank Battalion – Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia;
 - 239th Separate Intelligence Battalion – Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia;
 - 136th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade – Buinaksk, Dagestan;
 - 481st Air-Defence Missile Regiment – Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia;
- The 42nd Motor Rifle Division – Khankala, Chechnya, represented by:

- Special Battalion “Vostok” – Gudermes, Chechnya (currently, under the GRU command);
 - 70th Motor Rifle Regiment – Shali, Chechnya;
 - 71st Motor Rifle Regiment – Khankala, Chechnya;
 - 291st Motor Rifle Regiment – Borzoi, Chechnya;
- The 33rd Motor Rifle Mountain Brigade – Botlikh, Dagestan (formed by Vladimir Putin’s 30 June 2006 special decree – fully manned by 1 December 2007);
 - The 34th Motor Rifle Mountain Brigade – Zelenchuk, Karachai-Cherkessia (formed by Vladimir Putin’s 30 June 2006 special decree – was deployed to Abkhazia, but did not participate in hostilities);
 - The 114th Rocket Brigade – Znamensk, Astrakhan district (Tochka-U and Iskander missiles), testing center in Kapustin Iar, Astrakhan district;
 - 67th Separate Anti-Aircraft Rocket Brigade – Volgograd, Volgograd district;
 - 20th Motor Rifle Division – Volgograd, Volgograd district (was deployed to Abkhazia, but did not participate in hostilities);

2. *The Russian Airborne Forces, including:*

- The 76th Airborne Division – Pskov, Pskov district, represented by:
 - 104th Airborne Regiment;
 - 234 Airborne Regiment;
- The 98th Airborne Division – Ivanovo, Ivanovo district, represented by:
 - 217th Parachute Regiment;
- The 45th Separate Intelligence Regiment – Kubinka, Moscow district, namely, its 218th special forces battalion;
- The 7th Airborne (Mountain) Division – Novorosiysk, Krasnodar krai, represented by:
 - 247th Airborne Assault Caucasus Cossack Regiment – Stavropol, Stavropol krai (entered Kodori Gorge);
- The 31st Airborne Brigade – Ulianovsk, Ulianovsk district (was deployed to Abkhazia, but did not participate in hostilities);

3. *The Russian Military Intelligence (GRU) Special Forces, including:*

- The 22nd Special Forces Brigade – Aksai, Rostov district;
- The 10th Special Forces Brigade – Molkino, Krasnodar district;

4. *The Russian Air Forces including:*

- The 4th Army of the Russian Air Forces – Rostov on Don, Rostov district, represented by:
 - 1st Air Division’s (Eysk, Krasnodar krai) 368th Assault Aviation Regiment – Budyonnovsk, Stavropol krai (SU-25);


- 1st Air Division's (Eysk, Krasnodar krai) 461st Assault Aviation Regiment – Krasnodar, Krasnodar krai (SU-25);
 - The 37th Air Army of the High Supreme Command (Strategic Purpose) - Moscow, represented by:
 - 22nd Heavy Bomber Air Division's (Engels, Saratov district) 52nd Heavy Bomber Air Regiment – Shaykovka, Kaluga district (TU-22M3);
 - 22nd Heavy Bomber Air Division's (Engels, Saratov district) 840th Heavy Bomber Air Regiment – Soltsy, Novgorod district (Tu-22M3);
 - The 929th State Flight and Test Center of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation named after V.P.Chkalov – Akhtiubinsk, Astrakhan district (SU-24M);
 - The 4th Center of Combat Application and Training of Pilots named after V.P.Chkalov – Lipetsk, Lipetsk district (SU-24M);
 - Some other SU-24, SU-25, SU-27, MIG-29 air-regiments (exact names unknown). A large number of these planes flew up from the Mozdok airbase in North Ossetia;
5. *The Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Naval Forces, including:*
- 30th Surface Warship Division's 11th Anti-submarine Ship Brigade, represented by:
 - Guided Missile Cruiser “Moskva,” 1983;
 - ASW Destroyer “Smetliviy,” 1969;
 - 30th Surface Warship Division's 197th Amphibious Ship Brigade, represented by:
 - Landing Ship “Tsezar Kunikov,” 1986;
 - Landing Ship “Saratov,” 1966;
 - Landing Ship “Yamal,” 1987;
 - 41st Missile Boat Brigade's 166th Novorossiysky Small Missile Boat Battalion, represented by:
 - Guided Missile Corvette “Mirazh,” 1983;
 - Guided Missile Corvette “Samum,” 1991;
 - 184th Novorossiysk Coastal Defence Brigade, represented by:
 - ASW Corvette “Povorino,” 1989;
 - ASW Corvette “Kasimov,” 1986;
 - 112th Patrol Ship Brigade, represented by:
 - Small Patrol Ship “Equator,” 1968;
 - 68th Coastal Defence Warship Brigade's 400th Antisubmarine Ship Battalion, represented by:
 - ASW Corvette “Suzdalets,” 1983;
 - 68th Coastal Defence Warship Brigade's 418th Minesweeper Battalion, represented by:
 - Seagoing Minesweeper “Turbinist,” 1972;
 - Seagoing Minesweeper “Zhukov,” 1977.

b) What percentage were conscripts and reservists?

All units involved from the Georgian side were comprised of professional servicemen and no conscripts participated in the hostilities. Due to the scale of the Russian invasion, the Ministry of Defense of Georgia issued an order to mobilize reservists (approximately 5,000 were mobilized). However, they did not engage in hostilities.

6. What were the organization and the chain of command and control?

The chain of command and control of the Georgian military operation:



7. What were the levels of decisions for the choice of targets and assets engaged?

In line with the objectives of the operation and based on intelligence data, the Joint Task Force TCP of Georgian armed forces identified military targets that were communicated to the tactical level.

Fire was directed at two types of targets: a) pre-determined targets based on intelligence information; b) targets identified during the operation, from where the fire against Georgian-controlled villages, peacekeepers as well as against the GAF originated.

The predetermined target matrix with enemy positions was elaborated by the J2 department for Artillery and the Air Force. In addition to predetermined targets, fire was directed at targets that due to their use by the enemy for combat purposes became legitimate targets.

According to the Rules of Engagement in force, unit commanders (at Brigade, Battalion, Company, Platoon level) identified individual targets of such nature during combat and were authorized to make decisions on returning fire.

Categories of Artillery Objectives and Assets Engaged

1. Military objectives inside the city of Tskhinvali and its outskirts as well as fire support for the GAF movements on the flanks (Howitzers and guns of 120, 152 and 203mm caliber);
2. Moving enemy convoys on the Dzara and Geri by-pass roads as well as in the vicinity of the Gupta bridge (122 and 162mm MRLS); and
3. The Gupta bridge (203mm gun and air bombing).

Predetermined Military Targets, Including Russian Military Convoy Moving South

1. The Gupta bridge;
2. Armored convoys in the by-pass roads of Dzara and Geri;
3. The so-called “rehabilitation centre” in Tskhinvali (Barracks of 2,500 servicemen).
4. The so-called Ministry of Defense in Tskhinvali;
5. The headquarters of proxy militants in the so-called “Shanghai” settlement in Tskhinvali;
6. A platoon fortified position reinforced with three tanks in the vicinity of the asphalt factory in Tskhinvali;
7. A company fortified position reinforced with armor units (Tliakana height);
8. A platoon fortified position reinforced with 3-5 armor in the vicinity of the so-called tractor factory in Tskhinvali;
9. A platoon fortified position reinforced with 3-5 armor in the vicinity of the cement factory in Tskhinvali;
10. One battalion of enemy artillery located in the vicinity of the villages of Dampaleti and Monasteri;
11. One armored unit in the vicinity of the village of Kusireti;
12. Artillery positions in the vicinity of the village of Khetagurovo;
13. A platoon fortified position reinforced with armor and 120mm mortars in the vicinity of the village of Ubiati;
14. The military base on Uradanta Mountain.

8. What training had been given to troops involved in the operations on the International Law of Conflict? What plans were made for the protection of civilians before military operations began? What did the regular forces do in order to prevent human rights violations, including looting, burning of houses etc., during the hostilities of August 2008 and afterwards?

- a) **What training had been given to troops evolved in the operations on the International Law of Conflict?**

A thorough course on International Humanitarian Law is part of the academic program of the Georgian Armed Forces’ Military Academy. Lectures are delivered by instructors trained in San-Remo during a series of courses of International Humanitarian Law, organized by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

In addition, an agreement “On Cooperation in the Area of Integration of International Humanitarian Law” was signed between the Ministry of Defense of Georgia and the International Committee of the Red Cross on October 25, 2002. On March 16, 2007, a “Memorandum of

Understanding between the Ministry of Defense of Georgia and the International Committee of the Red Cross in the field of Dissemination of the Rules of International Humanitarian Law” was signed. On the basis of these agreements, representatives of the Georgian Armed Forces attended workshops on International Humanitarian Law.

It is noteworthy and relevant to mention that a significant number of Georgian Armed Forces personnel participated in different peacekeeping and international peace support operations, including in Iraq and Kosovo. All of those servicemen received extensive training in International Humanitarian Law.

b) What plans were made for the protection of civilians before military operations began?

Due to the fact that Georgian government had no planning conducted for military operations, no specific plan for the protection of civilian population existed.

Order of the President of Georgia issued on August 7, 2009 on launching defensive operation in response to ongoing Russian invasion specifically defined protection of civilians in the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia as one out of four primary objectives. Georgian military were not only bound to respect principle of distinction but also requested to ensure protection of civilians, including those residing in villages under the control of central government, north of Tskhinvali, subject to heavy artillery shelling.

Detailed information about the actual performance of Georgian Armed forces is provided in the answers to the Humanitarian and Military sections of the questionnaire. Within the context of this question information about the context and aims of the humanitarian corridor established by the Georgian government on 8 August 15:00 is of importance. Despite risky from military point of view for the purpose of allowing remaining civilians to leave areas affected by military operations Georgian government declared humanitarian corridor from 15:00 to 18.00 from Tskhinvali to Ergneti.

c) What did the regular forces do in order to prevent human rights violations, including looting, burning of houses etc., during the hostilities of August 2008 and afterwards?

During the hostilities, earlier trainings in human rights, military police presence and clear instruction coming from the superior authority was to ensure, that all civilians in the area affected by the war were protected. It is noteworthy, that Georgian militaries have not been accused of looting nor mistreatment of civilians. However, if any credible information becomes available to Georgian government, it will be thoroughly investigated.

It is noted by the Human Rights Watch, that Georgian military strictly followed the order of the President to “Protect Civilians”:

*The majority of witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch did not complain about other types of violations against them by the Georgian forces. Judging by their statements, **in most cases the troops entering the villages did not deliberately cause physical harm to civilians.** Several Ossetian interviewees said that Georgian soldiers told them they were under orders to look for and pursue Ossetian militias, **but to spare women, children and elderly during the ground offensive.**¹*

¹ Human Rights Watch, *Up In Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia*, 2009. p. 61

Zareta Z., from the village of Sarabuki, said that when Georgian soldiers entered the basement where she was hiding with her husband, they told them, “Now you’ll live with us, with Georgians, and we’ll live in peace. **Misha [Saakashvili] told us not to touch women and children.** We’re instructed to kill the young guys [fighters] only. And that’s what we’ll do. You are not to worry.” Another woman from the same village, “Svetlana S.,” also said that the Georgian soldiers were telling the residents, “**We have not killed any residents and we are not going to! Everyone is safe!**”²

It is also to be noted, that even after Russian occupation Georgian Government tried its best to maintain at least minimal police presence to provide some protection to the civilians. Police was indeed the last to leave the villages and towns after Russian forces arrival. For the sole purpose of providing moral support to civilian population and at least record, if not to prevent the mistreatment and looting, police in Zugdidi (west Georgia) even agreed to be disarmed by occupational forces in exchange of the permission to stay.

However, it must be admitted, that no effective result was achieved from these efforts, as human rights violations by Russian militaries as well as their proxy authorities and irregular forces, mistreatment, looting, burning, killing and discrimination on ethnic grounds was a heavy burden on civil population of affected areas during the hostilities as well as aftermath.³

10. What plans were made for a withdrawal and redeployment of forces from the zone of conflict? What was the sequence and timing of any such withdrawal or redeployment?

a) What plans were made for a withdrawal and redeployment of Forces from the zone of conflict?

A plan for withdrawal of Georgian Armed Forces from the conflict zone was elaborated during the war. No such plan existed prior to the war.

b) What was the sequence and timing of any such withdrawal or redeployment?

On August 10, 2008, the Georgian Armed Forces were ordered to pull back and to take defensive positions at the South Ossetia administrative border.

On August 11, 2008, the Georgian Armed Forces were ordered to withdraw from the theatre of war, to move to secure areas, and to conduct appropriate activities for defending the capital Tbilisi.

² Human Rights Watch, *Up In Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia*, 2009. p. 61

³ See annex to Q8: The List of Incidents